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Will Slocombe & Charley Baker 
seeing things … diffeRentLy,                          
oR, haLLuCinating the postModeRn
From thermodynamics and rocket technology to the deep web, Thomas 
Pynchon’s novels and stories have often juxtaposed science and technology 
with unusual, not to say downright implausible happenings. This is per-
haps the result of a fascination with contorting scientific knowledge into 
strange applications, whether as metaphors for social mores or to see how 
far its logics can be pushed toward the breaking point, but it is assuredly 
grounded in the relationship between the human and the technological 
and how American society deals with its contemporary technological 
environment. For example, Bleeding Edge explores the growth of the 
internet and the dot-com boom, Vineland focuses on television and film, 
and Gravity’s Rainbow deals with the V2 rocket program. Obviously, such 
reductive statements omit the complexities of Pynchon’s inclusions of and 
allusions to competing paradigms and conspiracy theories, but in each 
case what is foregrounded is how individuals understand and relate to the 
world.
As such, it is possible to assert that Pynchon’s fictions have always been 
involved in representing and articulating “states of mind.” Such states 
might differ across his fictions in terms of their setting and context, but 
whether concerned with the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair (Against the Day), 
the 9/11 attacks (Bleeding Edge), California at various points (The Crying 
of Lot 49, Vineland, Inherent Vice), World War Two and its aftermath (V, 
Gravity’s Rainbow), or even colonial America (Mason & Dixon), Pynchon’s 
works are invariably concerned with seeing things “differently” than estab-
lished histories might otherwise imply and, moreover, foregrounding the 
relativism and partiality of any individual perspective or overly simplified 
way of perceiving the world. His protagonists search for answers to make 
sense of their experiences as they are cast adrift from meaning; in the case 
of Slothrop from Gravity’s Rainbow, he is literally lost as he disappears 
from the narrative part way through.
Within this framework, a recurrent trope of Pynchon’s fictions is nega-
tive psychological responses to the environment (paranoia, uncertainty, 
emotional and epistemological insecurity) as a result of a failure to rec-
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oncile individual experiences with something defined as normal or nor-
mative. Pynchon’s characters neither grow nor find answers, but this is 
precisely the point: they accumulate data, clues, and/or experiences, but 
no single answer suffices to define everything, and no individual’s answer 
corresponds to any other’s. As a result of this, one of the disciplines/dis-
courses most often referenced in his fictions is psychiatry, for even when 
not directly connected to the narrative arc, psychological and psychiatric 
terminology and characters are nonetheless present and serve to lead the 
reader to the perception that reality is contested, not a given, and that per-
ception is not straightforwardly schematic.
More specifically, this article examines the ways in which perceptions 
of hallucinations—as psychiatric symptoms—have been represented in 
Pynchon’s works and, more importantly, how they have augmented and 
shifted the territory upon which distinctions between hallucination and 
reality are founded. Within his work is a suspicion of the modes of psychi-
atric classifications and an attendant concern with the problems of control 
in the creation of such classifications, and we see this as broadly emblem-
atic of a particular perspective evident within postmodern literature 
and theory. In this interpretation, Jean-François Lyotard’s much-vaunted 
“incredulity toward metanarratives” is foreshadowed within Pynchon’s 
oeuvre as a suspicion towards those who would describe and define reality 
at the expense of other worldviews (xxiv).1 After a brief examination of 
how theorists such as Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard have repre-
sented postmodern society, this essay moves on to explore the problems of 
binary-based psychiatric definitions of hallucinations. What is of interest 
here is the manner in which postmodern fiction, vis-à-vis Pynchon, mobi-
lizes elements of psychiatry and previously deemed pathological experi-
ences to illuminate the postmodern condition more generally, and similarly 
how this appropriation occurs in postmodern literary and cultural theory.
PostmoderN reality 
The question of what reality is and how we understand it has been 
fashionably foregrounded in critical theory for some time now. Ontology 
as a philosophical concern may have been a question of philosophy since 
its origins, but each new theory posits an ontological problem, placing a 
filter upon the ways in which the world is perceived. Today’s critics and 
commentators deal with a plethora of techniques to unmask ideological 
concerns within their objects of study, with each theory presupposing its 
own axiomatic account of what reality is, and somewhere along the way 
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the notion of reality as a stable, objective entity became outmoded, leaving 
a deconstructed world with no inherent meaning outside of an interpreta-
tive free-for-all.
Postmodernism may merely have been the latest incarnation of this 
radical questioning of the world and what reality means, but it has had a 
significant impact across a broad array of fields and discourses, and some 
of its primary commentators, such as Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Jameson, 
have moved the debate into an area more properly reserved for the psy-
chological and psychiatric disciplines. Such disciplines obviously have 
concerns about postmodernism—not least, for example, in their mobiliza-
tion of postmodern theory to inform clinical thinking about madness and 
its treatment, as seen in the burgeoning sub-discipline of post-psychiatry 
(see, for instance, Bracken and Thomas). In many respects this is a nat-
ural symbiosis, for postmodernism seems to ally itself with the forces of 
irrationality, asserting that scientific materialism (as seen in biomedical 
discourses on psychiatry) is merely one discourse among many, and that 
despite psychiatry’s demonstrable ability to replicate results and build 
a coherent model of the world, it is merely another form of ideological 
control manifesting an outmoded Enlightenment rationality. For many 
postmodernists, scientific discourse is merely another metanarrative to 
be incredulous towards (to paraphrase Lyotard); for many working in the 
sciences, the metaphorization of science smacks of illogical thinking and 
a return to some kind of ill-thought-through cultural backlash against 
progress. 
Jameson and Baudrillard are not immune to claims, despite their general 
distaste of what might be termed the postmodern condition. Jameson’s ter-
minology of the schizophrenic postmodern subject and Baudrillard’s hal-
lucinatory hyperreal both de-pathologize schizophrenia in many respects, 
to offer a metaphor for a wider cultural experience of fragmentation and 
dissolution. Jameson’s thinking deserves here to be quoted at length:
If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its 
pro-tensions and re-tensions across the temporal manifold and to 
organize its past and future into coherent experience, it becomes dif-
ficult enough to see how the cultural productions of such a subject 
could result in anything but “heaps of fragments” and in a practice 
of the randomly heterogeneous and fragmentary and the aleatory.… 
I have found Lacan’s account of schizophrenia useful here not 
because I have any way of knowing whether it has clinical accu-
racy but chiefly because—as description rather than diagnosis—it 
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seems to me to offer a suggestive aesthetic model.… Lacan describes 
schizophrenia as a breakdown in the signifying chain, that is, the 
interlocking syntagmatic series of signifiers which constitutes an 
utterance or a meaning…. When the links of the signifying chain 
snap, then we have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of distinct and 
unrelated signifiers. The connection between this kind of linguistic 
malfunction and the psyche of the schizophrenic may then be grasped 
by way of a twofold proposition: first, that personal identity is itself 
the effect of a certain temporal unification of past and future with 
one’s present: and, second, that such active temporal unification 
is itself a function of language, or better still of the sentence, as it 
moves along its hermeneutic circle through time. If we are unable to 
unify the past, present, and future of the sentence, then we are similarly 
unable to unify the past, present, and future of our own biographical 
experience or psychic life. With the breakdown of the signifying chain, 
therefore, the schizophrenic is reduced to an experience of pure material 
signifiers, or, in other words, a series of pure and unrelated presents 
in time. (Jameson 25–26; our emphases)
The schizophrenic state is precisely that which Jameson finds in post-
modernism, or the “cultural logic of late capitalism”: flat affect and an 
existence with no depth or meaning. Similarly, Baudrillard’s definition of 
the hyperreal resorts to a similar sense of loss, in terms of society’s inability 
to discover what is real. For Baudrillard, the hyperreal is the condition of 
a society which has moved so far into the realms of signs that it has left 
behind the reality upon which they were based, their referents: “It is no 
longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor even of parody. It 
is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself.… A 
hyperreal henceforth sheltered from the imaginary, and from any distinc-
tion between the real and the imaginary” (4). Baudrillard, like Jameson, 
utilizes linguistic terminology in his description, but rather than asserting 
that the signifying chain is broken, argues that “signs of the real” have 
come to replace reality itself; we are lost in the process of signification 
without any recourse to a reality outside of them. This, for Baudrillard, 
nevertheless has the same effect, for within our hyperreal existence, “illu-
sion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible” (38). 
Baudrillard further asserts that the “unreal is no longer that of a dream or 
of fantasy, of a beyond or within, it is that of a hallucinatory resemblance 
of the real with itself” (142). The previously dreamlike unreal is not only 
existent in the postmodern age but bears a “hallucinatory resemblance” 
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to the real. The unreal—with hallucinations in mind, shall we say—is no 
longer externalized or localized inside the mind. It exists as an integral 
part of the hyperreal in which hallucinations of the real, thus far deemed 
clinically to be unreal, are indistinguishable from the real, which is in 
itself hallucinated. Hallucinations, in Baudrillardian hyperreality, are not 
clinical indicators but are integral to the “schizophrenic vertigo” that is the 
general cultural experience of the late twentieth century (152).
That both commentators resort to ideas of schizophrenia and hallucina-
tion is interesting, and there is obviously an amount of cross-contamina-
tion going on here, as critics within a field tend to bounce off each other’s 
perceptions and engage in similar practices, but what becomes evident are 
the ways in which—protestations to the contrary—they are in effect diag-
nosing the cultural milieu of postmodernism with schizophrenia.2 Without 
making generalized assertions about a society that is itself (and always has 
been) heterogeneous to a greater or lesser extent, it is worth briefly sum-
marizing the diagnostic psychiatric approach to schizophrenia with the 
postmodern condition in mind, and which has not changed significantly 
between the fourth and fifth editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (generally referred to as DSM-IV and DSM-V): 
“disorganized speech,” “hallucinations,” “delusions,” “grossly disorganized 
or catatonic behaviour,” and the broad spectrum “negative symptoms.” We 
see in the disorganized speech criteria Jameson’s appropriation of Lacan, 
but Baudrillard’s definition of the hyperreal is perhaps more properly an 
element of the hallucinations criteria, in the sense that the perception of 
unreality he discusses originates in the strange uncanny doubling of reality 
taking on its own appearance, without actually being real. One would be, 
quite literally, seeing things that aren’t there while believing that they were, 
and it is the lot of a postmodern, hyperreal society to do precisely that—to 
come to have a delusion, a belief in the reality of the illusion of the real 
that has replaced and removed the real itself.
PsyChiatry & halluCiNatioNs 
How did psychiatry reach its current conclusions on the abnormality 
and unreality of hallucinations? Richard P. Bentall provides an excellent 
introduction into the evolution of the syndromes comprising the psy-
choses.3 The origin of classification began with Emil Kraepelin in 1887, 
who stated in his Textbook of Psychiatry: 
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Judging from our experience in internal medicine it is fair to assume 
that similar disease processes will produce identical symptom pic-
tures, identical pathological anatomy and an identical aetiology. If, 
therefore, we possessed a comprehensive knowledge of any of these 
three fields—pathological anatomy, symptomatology, or aetiology—
we would at once have a uniform and standard classification of 
mental diseases. (qtd. in Bentall 12)
Kraepelin attempted to classify disorders of mental processes, terming psy-
chotic disorder under the umbrella phrase Dementia Praecox. Dementia 
Praecox, as Bentall states, was characterized by “irreversible deteriora-
tion” of cognitive and social functioning and consisted of delusions of 
persecution or grandiosity, inappropriate or absent emotional responses, 
“stereotyped behavior,” for example catatonic posturing, problems with 
attention, and crucially, hallucinations—primarily auditory or tactile 
(15). The term schizophrenia did not come into classificatory existence 
until Bleuler, writing around 1911, who attempted to unify the disorder 
with four key features, listed by Bentall as the “four As”—loosening of 
associations, ambivalence, autism, and inappropriate affect (23–24). Karl 
Jaspers followed Bleuler in distinguishing between psychoses, defined 
by “ununderstandability” (meaning that observers cannot relate to the 
beliefs of the psychotic individual), and neuroses, explainable through 
psychological analysis. For Jaspers, the distinction was clearly between 
“two apparently irreconcilable methods of comprehending mental symp-
toms: understanding and explaining” (Bentall 28). Finally, Kurt Schneider 
founded the keystones that hold fast to current diagnosis of psychotic 
disorders. Schneider was one of the first documented clinicians to assert 
that the form of a given symptom was more important diagnostically than 
the content—thus creating the foundation of contemporary psychiatry, 
designating the patient as a collection of symptoms rather than a unique 
person with diverse experiences. Schneider, again as documented by 
Bentall among others, famously developed a theorem of schizophrenia 
consisting of what he termed first rank symptoms: “all forms of hallucina-
tion, delusion, or passivity experience” (Bentall 31).4 Schneiderian first 
rank symptoms remain one of the primary diagnostic indicators of the 
psychotic illness schizophrenia. 
Despite these attempts to simplify psychoses into clinical categories, 
the diagnostic criteria for the large variety of psychoses which now exist, 
including various forms of schizophrenia, are vast. As Assen Jablensky 
asserts, even the most recent, vastly extended editions of the World Health 
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Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) and the 
DSM-IV (replaced in 2013 with the DSM-V) are unable to confidently and 
cohesively classify or even account for the non-schizophrenic psychotic 
disorders. He concludes that neither “DSM-IV nor ICD-10 provides, pres-
ently, adequate diagnostic criteria and classification for this group of dis-
orders,” after detailed exploration of a range of these type of acute, often 
reactive, and transient psychotic disorders (330). 
What links these existent but debated syndromes, as well as the schizo-
phrenic disorders and affective psychoses, is the potential presence of 
hallucinations. Hallucinations are clinically differentiated from illusions 
and misperceptions. Sims et al., in The New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry 
(situating these occurrences firmly within a neurobiological framework), 
write first on perception:
Perception is a complex process which is not restricted to the 
screening of physical signals by sense organs but implies the pro-
cessing of these data to represent reality. Ideas from structuralism, 
constructivism, and the philosophy of mind have influenced psy-
chiatric concepts of perception and the constitution of reality … 
recently the distinction between sensory screening and interpreta-
tive mentation has been confirmed by neurocognitive research. (56)
At first glance this definition of perception appears to acknowledge the 
idea of a subjective reality—after receiving sensory perceptions, they are 
interpreted to construct a reality. As individuals automatically perceive 
and process all of the time, reality is formed by a continual progres-
sion of reception, processing, and construction. Where, however, is the 
boundary drawn between normal and abnormal perception? In Symptoms 
in the Mind, Sims expands on the definition of perception to differentiate 
between sense perception, imagery, and fantasy—for example, the multi-
plicity of levels of consciousness involved in daydreaming forms a “highly 
complex experience which we have when direct perception is mixed with 
the interpretation of these perceptions: intrusion of associated memories; 
fantasies; evanescent sights, sounds and smells” (92). These perceptions 
become abnormal under two categories: “sensory distortions, where a real 
perceptual object is perceived distorted, and false perceptions, where a new 
perception occurs which may or may not be in response to an external 
stimulus” (93). Misperceptions come under the category of sensory dis-
tortions, while illusions and hallucinations fall under the heading of false 
perceptions. Illusions differ from hallucinations in the sense that they are 
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“based on a percept of a real object or event, which is misinterpreted, usu-
ally in accordance with a mood or special theme” (Sims et al. 57). Illusions 
are different from daydreams, misperceptions and so-called functional hal-
lucinations, and occur in the normal population frequently and without 
pathologization (Sims 96–97). 
In contrast to illusions, hallucinations are to be understood as, to quote 
the most oft-cited definition, a “perception without an object (within a 
realistic philosophical framework) or as the appearance of an individual 
thing in the world without any corresponding material event (within a 
Kantian framework)” (Sims et al. 57; Sims 98).5 Sims goes on to identify 
three primary etiological theories of hallucinations, all of which are quali-
fied by neurological experiments involving, among other things, sensory 
deprivation and the neural pathways in the temporal and occipital regions 
of the brain:
1) overstimulation affecting different levels of information   
  processing;
2) failure of inhibition of mental functions;
3) distortion of the processing of sensory information at the  
  interpretive level. (Sims et al. 58)
Sims et al. continue: 
The role in the production of hallucinations of the post-sensory 
interpretation and evaluation of stimuli is uncertain. In these terms 
hallucinations are a sort of deception, but this is not a sufficient 
description of their nature. Recent neurophysiological hypotheses 
and findings from neuroimaging studies have suggested that there is 
an “inner censorship” which deals with the ambiguities of percep-
tion by setting hierarchies of contingencies. (58)
The interpretation and evaluation of stimuli after the sensory perception is 
a psychological process rather than a biological one. 
Psychological models place hallucinations at the center of a person’s 
experience rather than designating them as merely some form of neuro-
logical short circuit. These models are perhaps more applicable to the post-
modern existence explored by postmodern authors than the potentially 
reductive neurological and biological models. Bentall explores a number 
of psychological theories regarding hallucinations. Firstly, drawing on 
John Strauss’s work, he asserts that “hallucinations exist on a continuum 
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with normal mental imagery” (353). This assertion is fundamental to the 
studies he then examines. With specific focus on the most commonly 
found type of hallucination, Bentall argues that, given the evidence sug-
gesting that a considerable number of the general population have been 
found to experience auditory hallucinations, the key to developing a 
psychological model of hallucinations could lie in three main areas.6 
First, Bentall acknowledges that “patients’ beliefs about their voices may 
influence how they are experienced”; hence, if the voices are positive and 
unobtrusive, patients are more likely not to feel they are pathological or 
seek help (Bentall 355–56). Second, he maintains that contrary to clinical 
definitions of hallucinations, which fundamentally rely on the perception-
without-stimulus assumption, external stimuli—particularly lack of, in 
terms of sensory deprivation—have a significant effect on the intensity 
and duration of hallucinatory experiences (357–58). Third, he recognizes 
that stressful events, in particular bereavement, can induce hallucinatory 
experiences in previously well people (358–60). These three factors lead 
Bentall to conclude that there may be a degree of self-induction to the hal-
lucinatory experience, at the level of inner speech and source monitoring 
(our ability to differentiate between interior thoughts and feelings and the 
exterior world around us). Bentall’s model suggests that when there are 
dysfunctions in source monitoring, hallucinations can occur at varying 
levels along the scope of experience—“hallucinations arise from an error 
of judgment rather than an error of perception.… hallucinating can be 
explained in terms of the same kinds of mental processes that affect 
normal perceptual judgments” (367). In comparison with the biochemical 
model described above, here it is an individual’s processing and evalu-
ational skills that are crucial to hallucinatory experience, rather than a 
neurochemical misfire. 
The depathologized idea that hallucinatory experiences exist on a con-
tinuum is particularly relevant to the idea of a postmodern psychosis, 
evoked in postmodern fiction and cultural theory, which suggests that pre-
viously pathological distinctions between real (absence of psychosis) and 
unreal (psychosis) are now less clear than we initially perceived. Bentall 
states that in western societies, “where scientific materialism prevails, the 
need to distinguish between what is ‘real’ and what is ‘imaginary’ seems 
self-evident, whereas, in less materialistic cultures, this distinction is less 
important” (356). Bentall sounds almost like a postmodernist here, sug-
gesting that the models of hallucinations contra reality are not objectively 
true but rather products of a particular cultural mindset. 
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Returning to John Cutting’s definition of hallucination cited above, 
which consists of seeing hallucinations as perceptual abnormalities, a 
problem of regarding patients’ evaluations of their perceptual experiences 
as real/unreal is identified by Sims et al.: “Although some hallucinating 
patients mistake a hallucinatory perception for a realistic one, others can 
differentiate them; there is an ‘as if’ quality even when patients assert that 
they perceive real objects or events” (57). In order to formulate a definition 
of hallucination that accounts for patients’ abilities to differentiate between 
the unreality of their hallucinations and the reality of actual perceptions, 
Sims et al. draw on further definitions.7 In Sims’s own text, briefly exam-
ining the psychological models proposed by Bentall, he asserts that one of 
the “simplest facts about hallucinations is often one of the most difficult 
to comprehend. That is, to the patient, what the doctor calls a hallucina-
tion is a normal sensory experience. Subjectively, therefore, a hallucination 
is indistinguishable from a normal percept” (Sims 98). Hallucinations are 
experienced in the same manner as any other sensory perception, and 
what differs is the individual’s ability to discriminate between a so-called 
real precept and a hallucinatory one.
For those patients who do not differentiate their experiences as unreal, 
how can it be argued unequivocally that their hallucinations are not real? 
They are absolutely existent to that person at that time, despite some 
differentiation by individuals. As we have already seen, in postmodern 
cultural theory, the term reality, even the existence of any definable real, 
has become contentious, and Baudrillard in particular questions the 
status and nature of reality in the postmodern age, using hitherto purely 
psychiatric terminology and concepts as cultural critique. As a result, it 
is to some degree no longer possible to assert that there is a collective, 
correct, objective reality, nor to distinguish between a hallucinatory 
experience and a real one. A more accurate phraseology with reference 
to the (un)reality of hallucinations in the postmodern age could be the 
inclusive, non-hierarchal categories of shared perceptions and individual 
perceptions. Through the common clinical use of the term false perceptions 
in relation to hallucinations, the binaries of real/unreal, true/false, existent/
absent, are immediately evoked as fixed and correct. In postmodern fiction 
and cultural theory, such binaries are deconstructed and exposed as part of 
a hierarchical power system that exists in order to maintain the capitalist 
status quo, and hallucinations form a core component of how this 
manifests within Pynchon’s works. In such works, hallucinations are no 
longer clinical indicators of psychotic illness but existent and integral parts 
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of postmodern life and obviously do not manifest the discrete hallucinatory 
modalities described by psychiatrists.
PyNChoN aNd ParaNoia
Brian McHale’s Postmodernist Fiction asserts that postmodernism is pri-
marily an ontological category of literature, in the sense that, where mod-
ernist texts were epistemological (focused on knowledge), postmodern 
texts foreground a concern with what reality is. As if to prove McHale’s 
point, at least in theory, postmodern literature abounds with examples of 
potentially psychotic characters, those who are delusional or hallucinate, 
or those who cannot determine any form of absolute meaning. Despite 
the problems of delineating between modernism and postmodernism in 
this manner, this concern with the ontological within postmodern fic-
tion seems merited, particularly in relation to Pynchon’s fictions. Indeed, 
Pynchon’s characters, especially in his earlier works, are emblematic of, if 
not responsible for, this trend.8 For example, Oedipa Maas, the protagonist 
of The Crying of Lot 49, is unable to distinguish between reality and fantasy; 
Slothrop, in Gravity’s Rainbow, is unsure who is controlling his responses 
to the world; and in V, Herbert Stencil is never quite sure who, or indeed 
what, the mysterious “V” is meant to be despite his ongoing search.
However, another trend exists within Pynchon’s works, concerned not 
with those who are unsure of reality, but with those who ostensibly deter-
mine it. A recurrent feature of much of his early fiction is the role that 
psychiatrists and psychologists have in determining what is perceived to be 
real and normal, as opposed to what is considered to be unreal or abnormal, 
and which manifests itself in later works as an explicit engagement with 
psychiatric definitions. As such, psychiatry and psychiatrists are character-
ized, even caricatured, in his works as being concerned with defining what 
reality is, believing that they are capable of codifying and controlling the 
world, even if they are often proved wrong. Given the prevalence of mind-
altering substances and mind-controlling doctors in Pynchon’s work, it is 
unsurprising that he is credited by the Oxford English Dictionary with the 
first literary mention of psychiatrists as “shrinks” in The Crying of Lot 49, a 
signal perhaps of the contempt in which he holds their tendency to reduce 
human experience to a set of symptoms.
Evidently, psychiatrists in Pynchon’s work are farcical if not dangerous, 
and often both. In works such as Lot 49 and Gravity’s Rainbow, the psy-
chological disciplines are targeted by Pynchon precisely because they 
assert control over an individual’s sense-perceptions. Dr. Hilarius in Lot 
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49 conducts drug trials on his patients involving LSD and, as he tells 
Oedipa, “with the LSD, we’re finding, the distinction [between reality and 
madness] begins to vanish.” Hilarius chooses “to remain in relative para-
noia,” his persecutory delusions stemming from his persecution of Jews 
in Buchenwald, whom he used in “experimentally-induced insanity” (94, 
95). In the later Gravity’s Rainbow, the representatives of psychiatry are the 
Pavlovians, who are trying to control the world through conditioning. As 
Pynchon phrases it,
Pavlov believed that the ideal, the end we all struggle toward in sci-
ence, is the true mechanical explanation. He was realistic enough 
not to expect it in his lifetime. Or in several lifetimes more. But his 
hope was for a long chain of better and better approximations. His 
faith ultimately lay in a pure physiological basis for the life of the 
psyche. No effect without cause, and a clear train of linkages. (89)
This definition is provided by one such Pavlovian with “faith” in a “pure 
physiological basis for the life of the psyche,” Pointsman, who is later 
explicitly described in terms of control:
He is the pointsman. He is called that because he throws the lever 
that changes the points.… The pointsman has made sure we’ll go 
there. He hardly has any work at all. The lever is very smooth, and 
easy to push.… That is because he knows just where the points and 
the lever are. He is the only kind of man who puts in very little work 
and makes big things happen, all over the world. (644–65)
Pynchon’s suspicion of the level of power/control that Pointsman possesses 
reveals why the concept of paranoia has been dealt with extensively in crit-
icism of his work over the last forty years; through conditioning and con-
trol such characters act ostensibly as fulcrums within the text, determining 
other characters’ actions. However, as Leo Bersani notes in “Pynchon, 
Paranoia, and Literature,” “All the paranoid thinking in [Gravity’s Rainbow] 
is probably justified, and therefore—at least in the traditional sense of the 
term—really not paranoid at all” (101): it’s not paranoia if They are really 
out to get you.9 This indeterminate They, for Pynchon, is always concerned 
with power and control, and psychiatrists always work on Their side, 
leading the reader to question whether paranoia, delusions, and hallucina-
tions might in fact be a measure of social control: “I mean what They and 
Their hired psychiatrists call ‘delusional systems.’ Needless to say, ‘delu-
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sions’ are always officially defined. We do not have to worry about ques-
tions of real or unreal. They only talk out of expediency. It’s the system that 
matters” (Gravity’s Rainbow 638). This system that Pynchon criticizes leads 
us back to postmodern theory in the sense that he evinces a concern with 
what Lyotard calls metanarratives: totalizing definitions of the world that 
assert their own validity at the expense of any other understandings. For 
Lyotard, this can refer to religion, politics, or any other mode of thinking 
that brooks no argument. Psychiatry can obviously be perceived as one 
such system precisely because of the ways in which individuals can be 
considered unresponsive to treatment or a difficult patient, or even called 
in denial over disagreements with the practitioner’s view of the situation.
What Lyotard says can be interpreted in a more particular manner, 
however, for “incredulity toward metanarratives” can be interpreted as a 
suspicion toward sources (xxiv). That is, one can see in Lyotard, in his 
concerns of representing “the unpresentable in presentation itself,” a sus-
picion toward totalitarian worldviews and a vaunting of the hallucinatory 
experience (81). In Pynchon’s work, the classic example of this suspicion 
is Oedipa’s inability to determine the truth of the Tristero conspiracy. 
Throughout the text, she searches for evidence of some hidden organi-
zation working against the established US postal service. She sees their 
symbol, a muted post horn, in the most unlikely places, but by the end of 
the text she remains unsure: 
She had heard all about excluded middles; they were bad shit, to be 
avoided; and how had it ever happened here, with the chances so 
good for diversity? For it was now like walking among matrices of a 
great digital computer, the zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging 
like balanced mobiles right and left, ahead, think, maybe endless. 
Behind the hieroglyphic streets there would either be a transcendent 
meaning, or only the earth. In the songs … was either some frac-
tion of the truth’s numinous beauty … or only a power spectrum.… 
Ones and zeroes. So did the couples arrange themselves.… Another 
mode of meaning behind the obvious, or none. Either Oedipa in the 
orbiting of a true paranoia, or a real Tristero. (Crying 181–82)
Is Oedipa seeing things that aren’t there? Is she paranoid about the control 
that Pierce Inverarity, whose estate led to these discoveries, has over the 
world? Oedipa is forced to question every event and person she experi-
ences and encounters, unable to believe in their theories or the signs she 
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has to point her in various directions, such signs existing as only empty, 
misleading simulacra.
However, although readers might dismiss Oedipa as psychotic or drug-
addled, perhaps the problem is not within her, but in the world outside. 
Oedipa wants to learn the truth, but never stops to consider that there 
may not be a truth to find. In all these “ones and zeroes” that she sees 
as options, she cannot find the “excluded middles.” Importantly, these 
excluded middles and ones and zeroes recur in Gravity’s Rainbow, in the 
figure of the psychiatrist Pointsman:
But in the domain of zero to one, not-something to something, 
Pointsman can only possess the zero and the one. He cannot, like 
Mexico, survive anyplace in between. Like his master I. P. Pavlov 
before him, he imagines the cortex of the brain as a mosaic of tiny 
on/off elements. Some are always in bright excitation, others darkly 
inhibited. The contours, bright and dark, keep changing. But each 
point is allowed only the two states: waking or sleep. One or zero. 
“Summation,” “transition,” “irradiation,” “concentration,” “recip-
rocal induction”—all Pavlovian brain-mechanics—assumes the 
presence of these bi-stable points. But to Mexico belongs the domain 
between zero and one—the middle Pointsman has excluded from his 
persuasion—the probabilities. (55)
Pynchon seems to be arguing that although the chances may once have 
been “good for diversity,” it is Pointsman and “their” system of delusions 
that now control how reality works or, at least, is understood. The world 
has become a binary system of reality/illusion, “We” versus “They,” and the 
danger the reader faces when they try to “diagnose” Oedipa as psychotic 
or not, is that they must buy into such a binary system. That is, both 
Pointsman and Oedipa fall into the same trap, and so too can the reader if 
they fail to hold their desire for answers in check.10
Such a need for answers, and for the lies that such so-called truths per-
petuate, abound in Pynchon’s fiction: In V, the notion of “sewer stories”—
“They just are. Truth or falsity don’t apply”—is indicative of a sense that 
answers are sometimes irrelevant or at the very least contingent and partial 
(120). Later on, the narrator tells us that “the same motives which cause 
us to populate a dream-street also cause us to apply to a rock human quali-
ties like ‘invincibility,’ ‘tenacity,’ ‘perseverance,’ etc. More than metaphor, it 
is delusion” (325). Strong (psychological) words, indeed. Yet, continuing, 
he writes,
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Living as he does much of the time in the world of metaphor, the 
poet is always acutely conscious that metaphor has no value apart 
from its function; that it is a device, an artifice. So that whilst others 
may look on the laws of physics as legislation … [his] kind are along 
with the task of living in a universe of things which simply are and 
cloaking that innate mindlessness with comfortable and pious meta-
phor. (V 325–26)
In this binary of art as “comfortable and pious metaphor” versus science 
as “legislation,” Stencil is an unreliable narrator, and this is not so much a 
statement of fact, but a statement of attempting to superimpose a sense of 
facticity over chaos, and links very clearly back to Pynchon’s concern with 
excluded middles.
The nature of “excluded middles” throughout his fiction is to demon-
strate that binary oppositions miss the very real point of experience. They 
are found, more or less explicitly, throughout his fiction, and generally 
imbricated in the discourse of psychiatry. For example, in Against the Day, 
hallucinations are mentioned when a character suffering from lapses in 
memory seeks answers:
It would’ve helped if he could remember, but all he could produce 
was this peculiar haze. The experts he went to for advice had little 
to tell him. “Past lives,” some assured him. “Future lives,” said other 
confident swamis. “Spontaneous Hallucination,” diagnosed the 
more scientific among them. “Perhaps,” one beaming Oriental sug-
gested, “it was hallucinating you.” (37)
This is a classic Borgesian inversion of what would constitute reality to the 
individual; hallucinations, here, might not necessarily be the product of 
an individual inability to comprehend reality, as a somewhat traditionalist 
viewpoint would have it, but an integral component of that reality itself: 
it might be the case (although note that it is presented as an option, not a 
diktat) that reality is itself “hallucinating” our perceptions of it.
Another example, from Pynchon’s most recent novel Bleeding Edge, 
again reveals his awareness of psychiatric definitions and his attempts to 
emphasize their constructedness. Early on in the text, the reader is pre-
sented with a flashback by Maxine Tarnow, the protagonist, where she 
went on a cheap cruise and only later discovered that it was cheap because 
it was hosting AMBOPEDIA Frolix ’98, “a yearly gathering of the American 
Borderline Personality Disorder Association” (12). This fictional organiza-
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tion has something of an unofficial anthem, Madonna’s “Borderline,” and 
visits “literal geographical borderlines, a different one every year” (13, 15):
Shopping tours at Mexican maquiladora outlets. Gambling-addiction 
indulgence at the casinos of Stateline, California. Pennsylvania Dutch 
pig-outs along the Mason-Dixon line. This year the destination bor-
derline is between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, uneasy with 
melancholy karma dating back to the days of the Perejil Massacre, 
little of which has found its way into the brochure. (15–16)
In this section, Pynchon demonstrates a familiarity with the diagnostic 
criteria at that time, referencing both the DSM (a made-up disorder, 
“Generic Undiagnosed James Bond Syndrome … hasn’t made it into the 
DSM yet, but they’re lobbying, maybe the fifth edition”) and the ICD-9 
(“the 301 point 83 in the relationship”), and riffs on literal and meta-
phorical borders (14). This awareness is inflected through consumerism 
and conflict, and Pynchon knowingly alludes to the fact that borders serve 
to divide, although they are porous; the fact that he calls the organization 
the macaronic “ambopedia” (ambo- Latin “both”, -pedia Greek “related to 
learning”) implies that there is knowledge of both sides to be found at the 
border, and thus borderlines and excluded middles as contested territories 
are, perhaps, not so far apart as one might think.11
In short, and where we want to conclude this all-too-excluded muddle 
of Pynchonalia, is with the notion that this is precisely Pynchon’s point. 
Oedipa, like a number of Pynchon’s other characters, cannot determine 
what is true and what is not because she does not know which sources 
to trust. She is, in a strict sense of the term, “hallucinating” the world 
around her because she has lost her ability to source-monitor. As stated 
earlier, “it is our processing and evaluational skills that are crucial to hal-
lucinatory experience, rather than a neurochemical misfire,” and this is 
why Oedipa finds herself in the predicament she does: she cannot trust 
any of the options laid open to her, and Pynchon endeavors to replicate 
this, to varying degrees, in the reader’s perception of his fictions. Yet her 
solution to it, searching for meaning in either one or zero, misses the point 
and indeed compounds the error. Rather, Pynchon perhaps expects us 
to live with this insecurity and perhaps even relish it, for that means the 
world is not quotidian, not divided into “We” and “They,” and not reduc-
ible to a mere “hallucination,” to return to the world not believing that 
there is meaning behind it, but in it, like the “lightning-struck” of Gravity’s 
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Rainbow, which should perhaps be read with the DSM characteristics of 
schizophrenia, and Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra, in mind:
It will look like the world you left, but it’ll be different. Between 
congruent and identical there seems to be another class of look-
alike that only finds the lightning-heads. Another world laid down 
on the previous one and to all appearances no different, Ha-ha! But 
the lightning-struck know, all right! Even if they may not know they 
know. (Gravity’s Rainbow 664)
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Notes
1 Using Pynchon as a cultural lodestone of postmodernism, more particularly an Anglo-
American formulation of postmodernism, is of course potentially dangerous, for no one 
writer could emblematize the array of concerns that are covered by the term “postmod-
ernism.” That said, the prevalence of Pynchon on modules on postmodern literature—nor-
mally under the guise of his early novella The Crying of Lot 49—is indicative of the way 
in which his blend of cultural ennui, zany humor, and individual confusion in the face of 
consumerism and competing weltanschauungen has become a common perception of post-
modern culture.
2 One might also consider Deleuze and Guattari’s two-volume The Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia in this light, as part of a diagnosis of late capitalist or postmodern society.
3 Bentall’s summary can be found in Madness Explained (3–40). For a broader summary of 
the historical origins of mental illness and psychiatry, see Shorter. Also of interest is Pichot’s 
“The History of Psychiatry as a Medical Speciality,” which reveals an inherent insecurity 
among contemporary psychiatrists that due to the developments of the past 50 years they 
are losing much of their authority and axial status within the multi-disciplinary teams that 
now operate to care for psychiatric patients.
4 Bentall provides a clear table of Schneider’s first rank symptoms (table 2.1, 32–33). 
5 This definition originates in Cutting. It is worth noting that Cutting’s definition clearly 
relies upon a pre-existing definition of “realistic” frameworks and what constitutes a “mate-
rial” event.
6 See Johns for a detailed analysis of the evidence suggesting that hallucinations occur in 
non-psychotic persons.
7 One such definition comes from Werner Janzarick, who according to Sims et al. “defined 
hallucinations, without associating them with perception at all, as ‘free running psychic 
contents,’” a definition that is woefully non-specific (57).
8 That is, McHale utilizes Pynchon’s fictions to illustrate this tendency, thereby causing 
something of a tautological double bind to the proposition.
9 Paranoia is a recurrent theme of Pynchon criticism, but, to qualify this pre-established 
paradigm, perhaps it is more the case that readers are thereby focusing on the symptom 
rather than the cause. That is, paranoia is the observable symptom of Pynchon’s perception 
of society. In this sense, he uses the trope of hallucination because it embodies the inherent 
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difficulties in source-monitoring and sense perception at play in a character’s immediate 
perception of “reality” that then becomes reflected in their condition of “paranoia.”
10 Duyfhuizen gives a useful example of one reading that inherently links hallucinations 
to “reader-traps.”
11 Given Pynchon’s demonstrated knowledge of the diagnosis, one might wonder at the 
title of the novel itself, bleeding edge referring to cutting edge technologies that are untried 
and untested but, equally, to the self-harming behavior that is a core component of the 
apparent Borderline Personality Disorder diagnosis. But what of the significance of the ship’s 
name, the Aristide Olt (a stage name of Bela Lugosi), or the fact that it is a “Hungarian tramp 
container vessel … sailing under a Marshallese flag of convenience” (12)?—does this have 
a related meaning or, like all Pynchon’s puns, does it force the reader to question any overly 
simplistic interpretation?
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